D. K. v. Abington School District by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-11-2012 
D. K. v. Abington School District 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"D. K. v. Abington School District" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 228. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/228 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                                                                    PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________________ 
 
No. 10-2189 
__________________ 
 
D. K., a minor, by and through his parents,  
Stephen K. and Lisa K.;  STEPHEN K.; LISA K., adults,  
individually and on their own behalf, 
 
                                                                      Appellants  
v. 
 
ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 
___________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 08-cv-04914) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
___________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 9, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN  
and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
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____________________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This case requires us to decide whether a public school 
district’s failure to designate a struggling student as disabled 
violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1419, or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.  In making this determination, we 
delineate for the first time the scope of the statutory exceptions 
to the IDEA’s statute of limitations. 
I 
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A 
In the fall of 2003, D.K. began attending kindergarten in 
a half-day program at Copper Beech Elementary in the 
Abington, Pennsylvania, School District (the School District).  
During that year, he struggled with reading and misbehaved 
regularly.  According to the School District’s psychologist, Dr. 
Suzanne Grim, and the Copper Beech principal, Dr. Jan Kline, 
D.K. failed to progress in several areas, including: following 
oral directions, listening to and acknowledging the contributions 
of others, exhibiting self-control, following rules, producing 
neat and legible work, completing class work in the time 
allotted, and using non-instructional time appropriately.  At the 
same time, Dr. Grim stated that while some preschool and 
kindergarten students have difficulty following directions, it 
does not necessarily indicate a disorder.  A conference form 
completed by D.K.’s kindergarten teacher indicated that D.K. 
exhibited “much growth.”  D.K. received “proficient,” “basic,” 
and “below basic” marks in various reading skills,  and received 
one-on-one reading services from a specialist.  At the conclusion 
of the year, the School District recommended that D.K. repeat 
kindergarten. 
Although D.K.’s second year of kindergarten was a more 
intensive full-day program, he showed little maturation.  In 
conference forms, D.K.’s teacher noted D.K.’s proficiency in 
reading and advanced scores in math, but she expressed concern 
about his behavior, his tendency to rush through classwork and 
turn in incomplete assignments, and his difficulty controlling 
himself, especially when he became upset.  Indeed, D.K. threw 
temper tantrums and was “defiant” and “extremely  
argumentative.”  His teachers documented forty-three tantrums 
between March 14 and May 24, 2005. 
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 In response, D.K.’s teachers implemented “behavior 
plans,” including a sticker chart and a system using popsicle 
sticks, but they did not conduct a functional behavioral 
assessment.  D.K.’s parents were optimistic about, and 
cooperative in, these behavioral improvement plans.  In the 
meantime, D.K. was “doing very well academically,” and, for 
the most part, “play[ing] well with others,”.  Nevertheless, at the 
end of the year, having witnessed little behavioral progress, 
D.K.’s parents and teachers shared a “major concern” about 
“how well [he] [would] handle a first grade classroom.” 
Within the first two months of D.K.’s first-grade year, his 
teacher convened a parent-teacher conference to discuss D.K.’s 
“listening/following directions and organizational weaknesses.” 
 D.K. had been copying another student’s work, was unable to 
recall instructions, exhibited poor organizational and planning 
skills, misplaced his work, stuttered, and often lost his train of 
thought.  To resolve these problems, the teacher recommended, 
among other things, measures D.K.’s parents could implement at 
home.  The possibility of a formal evaluation was not discussed 
at that time. 
At a second conference held the following month, D.K.’s 
parents learned that he continued to struggle in the classroom 
and was making obscene gestures towards his classmates.  At a 
third conference following the issuance of D.K.’s first report 
card in December 2005, his teacher noted continuing behavioral 
challenges, explained that she was “providing as many supports 
as [she could] to aid” D.K., and opined that while “it was too 
soon to discuss testing (because he [was] not failing), that might 
be an option down the road.”  The teacher’s notes reflect that 
D.K.’s parents saw “no significant problem” and attributed his 
behavior to “[D.K.] being [D.K.]”. 
 
5 
 
In January 2006, D.K.’s poor social skills led the School 
District to place him in a special social skills group run by Dr. 
Grim.  According to Dr. Grim, D.K. was “on par with” other 
students in the group. 
That same month, D.K.’s parents requested an evaluation 
of D.K., and on April 24, 2006, the School District administered 
a cognitive ability test, which measures “innate ability,” and a 
visual-motor integration test.  Dr. Grim also administered a 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–Fourth Edition and a 
Wechsler Individual Achievement Test–Second Edition, and 
observed D.K. in the classroom setting.  She prepared an 
Evaluation Report using the Behavior Assessment System for 
Children (BASC), specifically assessing whether D.K. suffered 
from Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).  She 
concluded that D.K.’s various scores placed him in average and 
low-average ranges, and that D.K. was not in need of special 
education services.  Based on the BASC ratings, which are 
completed by a student’s parents and teachers, D.K. was not in 
an “at risk” or “clinically significant” range.  His math and 
reading tests showed he was proficient in both.  D.K.’s parents 
signed a Notice of Recommended Education Placement form 
approving the April 2006 evaluation results, and D.K. was 
promoted to second grade beginning in the fall of 2006. 
Plaintiffs claim that despite extra help in math and 
reading—which consisted of 30 minutes and 180 minutes per 
week, respectively, —D.K. continued to struggle academically 
during second grade.  The School District, on the other hand, 
contends that D.K. made “considerable progress.”  The record 
shows his grades improved compared with first grade, but he 
fought with other children on the playground and on the bus. 
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Around January 2007, D.K. began seeing private 
therapist Dr. Linn Cohen.  At the end of March 2007, Dr. Cohen 
informed D.K.’s teachers and the School District that she was 
“[e]xtremely convinced” D.K. needed special placement.  D.K.’s 
teachers discussed the results of the April 2006 testing with Dr. 
Cohen, who mentioned the possibility of re-testing D.K.  At the 
end of the school year, D.K.’s father notified the school that 
outside testing had diagnosed D.K. with “auditory processing” 
and “sensory stimulation” problems. 
Before D.K. began third grade, in July 2007, his parents 
formally requested a second, more comprehensive evaluation.  
Additionally, despite improvement in D.K.’s behavior and 
academic performance at the beginning of his third-grade year, 
in September 2007 D.K.’s parents obtained a private pediatric 
neurological evaluation from Dr. Peter R. Kollros.  Dr. Kollros 
diagnosed D.K. with ADHD and opined that D.K.’s “learning 
would be enhanced if he were to have the usual kinds of school 
accommodations for children with ADHD, including if needed 
preferential seating, taking tests in an environment without 
unnecessary distractions, organization support, and possibly 
extra time for tests.”  Two months later, the School District’s 
own second round of testing determined that D.K. was eligible 
for special education services as a student with “other health 
impairment,” and he was offered an Individualized Education 
Program (IEP) on November 30, 2007. 
B 
On January 8, 2008, in the midst of finalizing D.K.’s IEP, 
his parents requested a due process hearing pursuant to the 
IDEA and requested an award of compensatory education for 
September 2004 through March 12, 2008, after D.K.’s IEP was 
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finalized and implemented.1  After four hearings, the state 
agency hearing officer denied Plaintiffs’ claims.  The appeals 
panel found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the hearing 
officer’s findings.  Having exhausted their administrative 
remedies, Plaintiffs sought review of those decisions in the 
District Court.2
The District Court affirmed the state agency in all 
  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
                                                 
1  The IDEA requires states to provide parents “[a]n 
opportunity . . . to present a complaint . . . with respect to any 
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate 
public education to such child.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); 
accord Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 
550 U.S. 516, 525 (2007).  The parents later may “request an 
‘impartial due process hearing,’ which must be conducted either 
by the local educational agency or by the state educational 
agency, and where a hearing officer will resolve issues raised in 
the complaint.”  Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 525 (citations omitted) 
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A), (3)).  Pennsylvania state 
regulations provide that parents “may request an impartial due 
process hearing” if they “disagree with [a] school district’s . . . 
identification, evaluation, or placement of, or the provision of a 
free appropriate public education to the student.”  22 Pa. Code 
§ 14.162(b). 
 
2  Under the IDEA, a reviewing federal court “(i) shall 
receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall 
hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) 
basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall 
grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). 
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respects.  It concluded that the IDEA’s statute of limitations, 
which was passed in 2004, barred Plaintiffs from seeking relief 
for any of the School District’s conduct prior to January 8, 2006, 
(two years before Plaintiffs requested a due process hearing), 
D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., No. 08-4914, 2010 WL 1223596, at 
*6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2010), and that Plaintiffs were ineligible 
for two statutory exceptions to the IDEA statute of limitations, 
id. at *4–6.  In concluding that the School District did not 
violate its obligation to identify students in need of special 
education, the District Court opined:  
[P]rior to receiving a diagnosis of ADHD and 
conducting its second evaluation, the [School] 
District had insufficient reason to believe that 
D.K. was a student with a mental impairment that 
substantially limited one or more of his major life 
activities.  The Court agrees with the Hearing 
Officer’s logic that one must take into account the 
fact that children develop cognitively and socially 
at different rates.  In this instance, the problems 
experienced by D.K., which later triggered a 
second special education evaluation, were not so 
pronounced in his earlier development. 
Id. at *7.  The Court also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the 
School District failed to provide D.K. a free appropriate public 
education (FAPE) before November 2007, when it designed an 
IEP for him.  The Court found that D.K.’s behavior did not 
require the school to conduct a functional behavioral assessment 
as part of the April 2006 evaluation and that the testing 
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performed at that time was legally adequate.3
II 
  Id. at *8–9.  
Finally, the District Court denied Plaintiffs’ request to introduce 
additional evidence, namely: (1) a report by Dr. Emily Perlis 
offering a post hoc analysis of the appropriateness of the School 
District’s responses to D.K.’s behavioral problems during each 
of his school years; and (2) the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education Guidelines, which set forth non-binding best 
practices.  Id. at *10–11.  Plaintiffs timely appealed, and we now 
consider the state agency and District Court decisions rejecting 
their claims. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over 
its final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
In cases arising under the IDEA, we apply a “modified de 
novo” standard of review, “giv[ing] ‘due weight’ and deference 
to the findings in the administrative proceedings.”  P.P. ex rel. 
Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 
(1982); S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 
260, 269–70 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Like the District Court, we “must 
accept the state agency’s credibility determinations unless the 
non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a 
contrary conclusion.”  Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. 
                                                 
3 In the District Court, Plaintiffs also alleged that the IEP 
developed in November 2007 following D.K.’s second 
evaluation failed to provide a FAPE.  D.K., 2010 WL 1223596, 
at *9–10.  The District Court rejected that argument, id., and 
Plaintiffs have abandoned it on appeal. 
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P.S. ex rel. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation, 
internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).  “The statute 
of limitations claims and [Plaintiffs’] claims for compensatory 
education . . . are subject to plenary review as conclusions of 
law.”  P.P., 585 F.3d at 735.  But “whether [Plaintiffs] proved 
an exception to the [2004 IDEA] statute of limitations, and 
whether the [School] District fulfilled its FAPE obligations . . . 
are subject to clear error review as questions of fact.”  Id. (citing 
S.H., 336 F.3d at 271).  Such “‘[f]actual findings from the 
administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie 
correct,’ and if [we] do[] not adhere to those findings,” we must 
“‘explain why.’”  Id. at 734 (quoting S.H., 336 F.3d at 270).  As 
the party seeking relief and the party challenging the 
administrative decisions, Plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion 
on their IDEA and Rehabilitation Act claims.  Ridley Sch. Dist. 
v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Schaffer v. 
Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005)). 
III 
“The IDEA protects the rights of disabled children by 
mandating that public educational institutions identify and 
effectively educate those children, or pay for their education 
elsewhere if they require specialized services that the public 
institution cannot provide.”  P.P., 585 F.3d at 735.  Accordingly, 
schools must: (1) identify children in need of special education 
services (Child Find); and (2) provide a FAPE to disabled 
students.  Plaintiffs contend that the School District neglected 
both duties by failing to identify D.K. as a disabled student 
based on his subpar behavioral and academic performances in 
kindergarten through third grade, by administering incomplete 
testing in April 2006 that was ill-suited to diagnose ADHD, and 
by offering inadequate support to D.K. before November 2007. 
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Because our analysis of the School District’s obligations 
under the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is 
circumscribed by the IDEA statute of limitations, see P.P., 585 
F.3d at 735–37, we begin by delimiting the time period to which 
D.K.’s claims apply. 
A 
The IDEA statute of limitations requires a parent to 
request a due process hearing within two years of “the date the 
parent . . . knew or should have known about the alleged action 
that forms the basis of the complaint.”4
                                                 
4 The IDEA statute of limitations also permits parents to 
request a hearing “in such time as the State law allows,” “if the 
State has an explicit time limitation for requesting such a 
hearing.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).  Pennsylvania has adopted 
the IDEA statute of limitations regulations in their entirety.  22 
Pa. Code § 14.102(a)(2)(xxix)–(xxx). 
  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(f)(3)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(e).  Parents have the same 
two years to file an administrative complaint alleging a violation 
of the IDEA or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)(6)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(2).  We have held that 
the IDEA statute of limitations applies to claims brought after it 
was passed in 2004, even if the conduct occurred before its 
passage.  Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 413–
16 (3d Cir. 2010).  We have also held that the IDEA statute of 
limitations applies to § 504 claims premised on IDEA 
obligations, such as those invoking Child Find and FAPE duties. 
 P.P., 585 F.3d at 735–37.  Therefore, the IDEA statute of 
limitations applies to all of Plaintiffs’ claims at issue in this 
appeal. 
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Plaintiffs do not dispute that because they requested a due 
process hearing on January 8, 2008, the statute of limitations 
generally would limit their claims to the School District’s 
conduct after January 8, 2006.  Nevertheless, they seek refuge in 
two exceptions to the statute of limitations and, alternatively, 
equitable tolling doctrines. 
The two exceptions upon which Plaintiffs rely state that 
the statute 
shall not apply . . . if the parent was prevented 
from requesting the hearing due to— 
(i)  specific misrepresentations by the local 
educational agency that it had resolved the 
problem forming the basis of the 
complaint; or 
(ii)  the local educational agency’s 
withholding of information from the parent 
that was required under this subchapter to 
be provided to the parent. 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i)–(ii); accord 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.511(f)(1)–(2).  Invoking subsection (i), Plaintiffs argue 
that the School District misrepresented D.K.’s success by 
advising that his academic, behavioral, and social deficits could 
be addressed through individualized supports short of special 
education placement.  Citing subsection (ii), Plaintiffs also 
assert that the School District did not provide them with a 
permission to evaluate form until January 5, 2006. 
While district courts within the Third Circuit have 
interpreted the statute of limitations exceptions on several 
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occasions over the last few years, the scope of these exceptions 
is an issue of first impression for United States Courts of 
Appeals. 
1 
a 
The first exception to the statute of limitations is set forth 
in § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i).  As district courts have noted, “both 
statutory and regulatory guidance are lacking” regarding the 
contours of the “specific misrepresentations” referenced in that 
exception.  I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 
842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 775 (M.D. Pa. 2012); accord Evan H. ex 
rel. Kosta H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., No. 07-
4990, 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008).  
Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the scope and meaning 
of subsection (i).  In crafting the implementing regulations, see 
34 C.F.R. § 300.511(f)(1), regulators did “not believe it . . . 
appropriate to define or clarify the meaning of 
‘misrepresentations,’ as requested by the commenters[, stressing 
that] [s]uch matters are within the purview of the hearing 
officer.”  71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006).  
Therefore, while we must delineate the meaning of this 
exception so we can review decisions of hearing officers and 
appeals panels, we reiterate that significant deference is owed to 
their applications of both exceptions and that we review them 
for clear error.  See P.P., 585 F.3d at 735. 
Several district courts and administrative adjudicators 
have interpreted the meaning of “specific misrepresentation” in 
§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i).  According to the Pennsylvania appeals 
panel, the majority view is that in order for the exception to 
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apply, “the alleged misrepresentation . . . must be intentional or 
flagrant rather than merely a repetition of an aspect of the FAPE 
determination.”  In re Educ. Assignment of C.C., Spec. Ed. Op. 
No. 1866, at 10 & n.64 (Mar. 5, 2008) (citing cases).  Several 
district courts have reached the same conclusion.  See I.H., 842 
F. Supp. 2d at 775 (“‘[A]t the very least, a misrepresentation 
must be intentional in order to satisfy [this exception].’” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at 
*6)); Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Deborah A., No. 08-2924, 2009 WL 
778321, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2009); Evan H., 2008 WL 
4791634, at *6 (“[T]o show a ‘specific misrepresentation,’ 
Plaintiffs must establish not that the [school’s] evaluations of 
the student’s eligibility under IDEA were objectively incorrect, 
but instead that the [school] subjectively determined that the 
student was eligible for services under IDEA but intentionally 
misrepresented this fact to the parents.”).  But see J.L. ex rel. 
J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., No. 06-1652, 2009 WL 
1119608, at *11–12 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2009) (finding negligent 
misrepresentation sufficient), abrogated on other grounds by 
Steven I., 618 F.3d 411. 
We agree that the high threshold articulated by the 
district courts reflects a proper interpretation of subsection (i).  
In the absence of a showing of “misrepresentation” akin to 
intent, deceit, or egregious misstatement, any plaintiff whose 
teachers first recommended behavioral programs or instructional 
steps short of formal special education might invoke the 
exception.  Mere optimism in reports of a student’s progress 
would toll the statute of limitations.  The allegations comprising 
a claim that a FAPE was denied or that Child Find obligations 
were not met would nearly always suffice to extend the 
timeframe beyond that dictated by the statute of limitations.  See 
I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (“We decline to hold . . . that action 
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which constitutes the basis for the IDEA claim itself can, absent 
more, satisfy the exception to the statute of limitations; doing so 
would allow the exception to become the rule, and the 
limitations period would be all but eliminated.”); Deborah A., 
2009 WL 778321, at *4; Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 n.3 
(“Plaintiffs would have the Court read ‘misrepresentation’ to 
include any occasion in which the actions of a local educational 
agency have failed to remedy an educational problem 
encountered by a student.  Such an exception would swallow the 
rule established by the limitation period.”).  This cannot be the 
intent of the regulation.  Rather, we conclude that a rule 
demanding at least a school’s knowledge that its representations 
of a student’s progress or disability are untrue or inconsistent 
with the school’s own assessments best comports with the 
language and intent of the provisions.  Therefore, we hold that 
in order to be excused from the statute of limitations based on 
§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i) because the school “specific[ally] 
misrepresent[ed] . . . that it had resolved the problem,” plaintiffs 
must show that the school intentionally misled them or 
knowingly deceived them regarding their child’s progress. 
Unlike subsection (i), the language of the second 
exception at § 1415(f)(3)(D)(ii)—“withholding of information 
from the parent that was required under this subchapter to be 
provided to the parent”—requires little elaboration.  The text of 
subsection (ii) plainly indicates that only the failure to supply 
statutorily mandated disclosures can toll the statute of 
limitations.  In other words, plaintiffs can satisfy this exception 
only by showing that the school failed to provide them with a 
written notice, explanation, or form specifically required by the 
IDEA statutes and regulations.  District courts in this Circuit 
have properly limited this exception to such circumstances.  See 
I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 775; Deborah A., 2009 WL 778321, at 
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*5; Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *7; see also Evan H., 2008 
WL 4791634, at *7 (concluding that subsection (ii) “refers 
solely to the withholding of information regarding the 
procedural safeguards available to a parent,” including “‘filing a 
complaint and requesting an impartial due process hearing’” 
(quoting D.G. v. Somerset Hills Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 
492 (D.N.J. 2008))); D.G., 559 F. Supp. 2d at 490, 492 
(applying the exception where the school failed to provide 
parents who had repeatedly requested a special-education 
evaluation with either “written notice explaining why [it] 
refused to evaluate” the student or a procedural safeguards 
notice, both of which are required by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3)(B) 
and (c)(1)(A)–(C) when a school refuses to evaluate or change a 
student’s educational placement). 
Having analyzed subsections (i) and (ii) of 
§ 1415(f)(3)(D), the clause that introduces those subsections—
“if the parent was prevented from requesting the hearing due 
to”—merits discussion.  This language imposes an additional 
requirement for invoking either of the two exceptions to the 
statute of limitations.  Establishing evidence of specific 
misrepresentations or withholding of information is insufficient 
to invoke the exceptions; a plaintiff must also show that the 
misrepresentations or withholding caused her failure to request a 
hearing or file a complaint on time.  The terms “prevented from” 
and “due to” denote a causation requirement.  Thus, where the 
evidence shows, for example, that parents were already fully 
aware of their procedural options, they cannot excuse a late 
filing by pointing to the school’s failure to formally notify them 
of those safeguards. 
b 
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Applying these standards to D.K.’s case, we find no clear 
error in the administrative findings below that Plaintiffs failed to 
prove the applicability of the exceptions to the IDEA statute of 
limitations. 
As to subsection (i), neither the School District nor its 
individual teachers intentionally or knowingly misled Plaintiffs 
regarding the extent of D.K.’s academic and behavioral issues or 
the efficacy of the solutions and programs they attempted.  
Throughout the relevant school years, D.K.’s teachers held 
numerous conferences with his parents at which they described, 
often in detail, his misconduct, frustration, challenges, and 
development.  The majority of these conferences were 
specifically aimed to notify his parents of his poor performance. 
 The School District proposed solutions, but it did not imply, let 
alone state with any confidence, that these measures would 
succeed or eliminate the eventual need for an evaluation.  
Individualized behavioral plans did yield some improvement, 
and the School District accurately reported those results to 
D.K.’s parents.  Notably, neither the conference forms nor the 
remainder of the record in this case suggest that the School 
District represented that these minor improvements resolved 
D.K.’s behavioral challenges or obviated the need for 
monitoring and parent-teacher cooperation, i.e. “resolved the 
problem forming the basis of the complaint,” § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i). 
 Moreover, teachers sought parental permission and input at 
every step.  When one of D.K.’s teachers suggested in 2005 that 
testing was not yet necessary, she cautioned that a more formal 
evaluation might be beneficial down the road.  Thus, the School 
District’s statements to D.K.’s parents fall well short of the sort 
of intentional or knowing misrepresentation required to toll the 
statute of limitations under § 1415(f)(3)(D)(i). 
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With respect to subsection (ii), Plaintiffs claim the School 
District provided them with neither a permission to evaluate 
form nor a procedural safeguards notification until after they 
requested an evaluation of D.K. in January 2006.  But the 
School District was not obligated to do so in these 
circumstances.  Procedural safeguard notices must be provided 
only when: (1) the student is referred for, or the parents request, 
an evaluation; (2) the parents file a complaint; or (3) the parents 
specifically request the forms.  See id. § 1415(d); see also 22 Pa. 
Code § 14.123(c) (requiring schools to keep permission to 
evaluate forms available, but mandating that schools provide a 
copy only when parents orally request an evaluation). 
As for the permission to evaluate form, Plaintiffs’ 
argument that the School District should have notified them of 
the availability of an evaluation pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.304 
also fails.  While the school “must provide notice . . . that 
describes any evaluation procedures the agency proposes to 
conduct,” 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(a) (emphasis added); accord id. 
§ 300.503, the regulations do not demand that the school 
preemptively advise parents of their right to have their child 
evaluated.5
                                                 
5 Citing Centennial School District v. S.D. ex rel. Daniel 
D., No. 10-4129, 2011 WL 6117278, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 
2011), Plaintiffs assert that their expressions of concern 
regarding D.K.’s academic and behavioral progress amounted to 
a request for an evaluation, triggering the School District’s duty 
to provide them with a procedural safeguards notice and a 
permission to evaluate form.  We disagree with that reasoning 
from S.D. because we cannot conclude that general expressions 
of concern constitute a “parental request for evaluation” under 
the plain terms of the statute.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1)(A)(i) 
  Even if the regulations did require such anticipatory 
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notice, Plaintiffs have not established causation; D.K.’s parents 
were not “prevented from requesting the hearing” by any such 
omission.  Their own unprompted request for an evaluation in 
January 2006 demonstrates that they were aware of their right to 
seek one.  Additionally, in December 2005, although the School 
District encouraged postponing a formal evaluation, it made 
D.K.’s parents aware of that option by noting that it might be an 
appropriate step down the road. 
2 
 Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that two common law 
equitable tolling doctrines should apply: (1) “minority tolling,” 
which applies to plaintiffs who were minors when their claims 
accrued; and (2) tolling because the School District prevented 
Plaintiffs from learning of the basis for their claims.  We 
disagree.   Although the statute is silent on the matter, legislative 
intent and the doctrine of exclusio unius preclude application of 
common law equitable tolling principles to save claims 
otherwise foreclosed by the IDEA statute of limitations.  First, 
the legislative and regulatory history of the 2004 amendments to 
the IDEA makes clear that only the enumerated statutory 
exceptions may exempt a plaintiff from having his claims time-
barred by the statute of limitations.  See S. Rep. No. 108-185, at 
40 (2003) (“The committee does not intend that common law 
determinations of statutes of limitations override this specific 
                                                                                                             
(emphasis added); see also 22 Pa. Code § 14.123(c) (“Parents 
may request an evaluation at any time, and the request must be 
in writing. . . . If a request is made orally to any professional 
employee or administrator of the school entity, that individual 
shall provide a copy of the permission to evaluate form to the 
parents within 10-calendar [sic] days of the oral request.”). 
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directive . . . .”); 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,697 (Aug. 14, 2006) 
(“It is not necessary to clarify that common-law directives 
regarding statutes of limitations should not override the Act or 
State regulatory timelines, as the commenters recommended, 
because the Act and these regulations prescribe specific 
limitation periods which supersede common law directives in 
this regard.”).  Second, “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates 
certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions 
are not to be implied, in the absence of a contrary legislative 
intent.”  Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 
(1980). 
Accordingly, IDEA plaintiffs cannot escape its statute of 
limitations by invoking equitable tolling doctrines recognized 
under state law.  They can argue only for the application of one 
of the statutory exceptions, as the district courts have correctly 
held.  See Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *5 (concluding that 
the IDEA statute of limitations “is not subject to the continuing 
violation or equitable tolling doctrines, but . . . instead, . . . can 
be extended only for one of the enumerated statutory 
exceptions”); J.L. ex rel. J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 
F. Supp. 2d 257, 269 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“The Court agrees . . . 
that the Regulations firmly establish that the two exceptions 
specifically set forth in the statute are the exclusive exceptions 
to the statute of limitations . . . .”). 
 In sum, because D.K.’s parents are ineligible for the 
statutory exceptions and because common law equitable tolling 
doctrines do not apply, their claims are limited to violations after 
January 8, 2006. 
B 
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 We next consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim that they 
are entitled to the equitable remedy of compensatory education 
because the School District failed to identify D.K. as disabled 
and to provide him a FAPE.  “‘A disabled student’s right to 
compensatory education accrues when the school knows or 
should know that the student is receiving an inappropriate 
education.’”  P.P., 585 F.3d at 739 (quoting Lauren W. ex rel. 
Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007)).  
When a school fails to correct a situation in which a disabled 
student “is not receiving more than a de minimis educational 
benefit,” the “child is entitled to compensatory education for a 
period equal to the period of deprivation, excluding only the 
time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the 
problem.”  M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 
389, 391–92 (3d Cir. 1996).  “Obviously the case against [a] 
school district will be stronger if the district actually knew of the 
educational deficiency or the parents had complained,” but 
where a school should have known if it had complied with its 
statutory duties, a compensatory-education remedy still may be 
appropriate.  Id. at 397. 
 The remedy of compensatory education is available only 
where a student’s substantive rights are affected by a school 
district’s non-compliance with the IDEA.  “Accordingly, ‘[a] 
procedural violation is actionable under the IDEA only if it 
results in a loss of educational opportunity for the student, 
seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or causes 
a deprivation of educational benefits.’”  M.R., 680 F.3d at 274 
(quoting D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 565 (3d 
Cir. 2010)). 
 “School districts have a continuing obligation under the 
IDEA and § 504”—called “Child Find”—“to identify and 
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evaluate all students who are reasonably suspected of having a 
disability under the statutes.”  P.P., 585 F.3d at 738 (emphasis 
added); accord 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111.  A 
school’s failure to comply with Child Find may constitute a 
procedural violation of the IDEA.  E.g., D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. 
v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(calling the Child Find requirement a “procedural regulation[]”); 
Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty., Ky. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 313 
(6th Cir. 2007) (characterizing noncompliance with Child Find 
as a procedural violation). 
Child Find extends to children “who are suspected of 
[having] . . . a disability . . . and in need of special education, 
even though they are advancing from grade to grade.”  34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.111(c)(1); accord L.M., 478 F.3d at 313; Taylor v. 
Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 737 F. Supp. 2d 474, 484 (W.D. Pa. 
2010).  As several courts have recognized, however, Child Find 
does not demand that schools conduct a formal evaluation of 
every struggling student.  See, e.g., J.S. v. Scarsdale Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 635, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The 
IDEA’s child find provisions do not require district courts to 
evaluate as potentially ‘disabled’ any child who is having 
academic difficulties.”).  A school’s failure to diagnose a 
disability at the earliest possible moment is not per se 
actionable, in part because some disabilities “are notoriously 
difficult to diagnose and even experts disagree about whether 
[some] should be considered a disability at all.”  A.P. ex rel. 
Powers v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 572 F. Supp. 2d 221, 226 (D. 
Conn. 2008). 
Plaintiffs claim that the School District violated its Child 
Find duties in three ways: (1) by failing to evaluate D.K. within 
a reasonable time after it should reasonably have suspected a 
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disability; (2) by conducting an inappropriate evaluation in April 
2006; and (3) by failing to suspect disability when D.K.’s 
struggles continued after April 2006. 
We have “‘infer[red] a requirement that [schools identify 
disabled children] within a reasonable time after school officials 
are on notice of behavior that is likely to indicate a disability.’”  
M.R., 680 F.3d at 271 (quoting W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 501 
(3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey 
City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007)).  This requirement 
“is implicit in the ‘child find’ duty.”  W.B., 67 F.3d at 501 
(holding that a jury could reasonably find a violation of Child 
Find where a school failed to conduct an evaluation within six 
months after the personal observations of teachers and the 
receipt of information from parents provided notice of the 
student’s likely disability).  Accordingly, such a delay can 
constitute a procedural Child Find violation. 
Moreover, a poorly designed and ineffective round of 
testing does not satisfy a school’s Child Find obligations.  See, 
e.g., G.D. ex rel. G.D. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 832 F. Supp. 
2d 455, 465–67 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (finding that the school’s 
reevaluation of an elementary school student with significant 
behavioral problems was inadequate because it overemphasized 
the student’s academic proficiency and assessed behavioral 
issues only cursorily).  The IDEA requires that initial 
evaluations upon suspicion of a disability 
(A) use a variety of assessment tools and 
strategies to gather relevant functional, 
developmental, and academic information, 
including information provided by the parent 
. . . [;] 
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(B) not use any single measure or assessment as 
the sole criterion for determining whether a child 
is a child with a disability or determining an 
appropriate educational program for the child; and 
(C) use technically sound instruments that may 
assess the relative contribution of cognitive and 
behavioral factors, in addition to physical or 
developmental factors. 
20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A)–(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(1)–(3).  
It further mandates, among other things, that evaluation 
materials be “used for purposes for which the assessments or 
measures are valid and reliable” and that children be “assessed 
in all areas of suspected disability.”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1414(b)(3)(A)(iii), (B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(1)(iii), (4).  
But while an evaluation should be tailored to the specific 
problems a potentially disabled student is having, it need not be 
designed to identify and diagnose every possible disability.  See 
P.P., 585 F.3d at 738–39 (rejecting the parents’ argument that 
an evaluation report was deficient because it failed to identify a 
math disability and did not test for social and emotional 
functioning, reasoning that “those areas were not identified as 
suspected disabilities and so were properly excluded” from the 
screening). 
We agree with the decisions below that Plaintiffs have 
failed to establish an unwarranted delay,6
                                                 
6 Although more than sixty days elapsed between the date 
on which Plaintiffs returned the permission to evaluate form to 
the School District, February 11, 2006, and the evaluation on 
April 26, 2006, see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(I) (giving 
 a deficient April 2006 
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evaluation, or evidence showing  the School District should 
reasonably have suspected D.K. was disabled and in need of 
special education services after April 2006. 
The School District was not required to jump to the 
conclusion that D.K.’s misbehavior denoted a disability or 
disorder because hyperactivity, difficulty following instructions, 
and tantrums are not atypical during early primary school years. 
 See L.M., 478 F.3d at 314 (finding no violation where witnesses 
testified that the student’s “difficulties would not necessarily 
indicate a disability or a need for special education, and that it 
would be inappropriate to rush to identify a child that young as 
disabled”); id. (noting that “[s]chool personnel . . . testified that 
[the student’s] behavioral and learning problems were not 
atypical of immature young boys”); see also Scarsdale Union, 
826 F. Supp. 2d at 662–63 (finding no Child Find violation 
where a high school junior’s absences and difficulty keeping up 
with assignments were “not unusual among first-semester 
juniors . . . [and] five or six other kids were having similar 
problems at the time”).  Moreover, D.K.’s report cards and 
conference forms indicated intermittent progress and even 
academic success in several areas.  Cf. L.M., 478 F.3d at 311 
                                                                                                             
schools sixty days to conduct an evaluation after receipt of the 
parents’ form), this mere procedural noncompliance is 
insufficient to merit compensatory-education relief unless it also 
resulted in the substantive denial of a FAPE.  See M.R., 680 
F.3d at 273; C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 66–
67 (3d Cir. 2010).  As we explain infra, we find no such 
substantive failure by the School District.  Separately, to the 
extent Plaintiffs claim the School District violated Child Find by 
failing to test D.K. before January 2006, their claim is barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
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(finding no violation where a student was “meeting 
expectations” in academic areas despite struggling with social 
and behavioral problems throughout elementary school). 
Nor do we find error in the conclusions that the April 
2006 battery of tests was adequate under Child Find.  Plaintiffs 
contend, among other things, that the School District’s failure to 
use a functional behavioral assessment rendered the testing 
legally inadequate.  But the IDEA and its implementing 
regulations do not require that a school use a functional 
behavioral assessment when initially testing students for 
suspected disabilities.7
                                                 
7 The IDEA’s only mention of the functional behavioral 
assessment method is in § 1415(k)(1)(D), which requires use of 
that technique when a disabled student, who is already being 
educated pursuant to an IEP, continues to exhibit behavioral 
problems.  This neither precludes nor requires use of a 
functional behavioral assessment in initial disability evaluations. 
 As with all evaluations, the component testing mechanisms 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the 
suspected disability and the student’s needs.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1414(b)(2)(A)–(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(1)–(3). 
  The four tests the School District did 
employ covered discrepant skill sets and probed for indicia of 
varying disabilities.  The mere fact that a subsequent evaluation 
of D.K. yielded a different result—i.e. he was found disabled 
with an “other health impairment” in November 2007 but did 
not qualify in April 2006—does not necessarily render the 
earlier testing inadequate.  Cf. M.R., 680 F.3d at 264–66 (finding 
no Child Find violation where a school’s February 2007 
evaluation concluded that a student did not have a learning 
disability but its February 2008 testing found reading, math, 
reasoning, and writing disabilities).  Therefore, we will not 
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second-guess the findings of the state agency or the District 
Court on this question.  D.K., 2010 WL 1223596, at *7–9. 
We are also unpersuaded that the School District violated 
its Child Find obligations by failing to suspect D.K. of a 
disability after the April 2006 evaluation based on further 
misconduct and additional opinions by his parents and private 
therapist.  See M.R., 680 F.3d at 273 (“When a school district 
has conducted a comprehensive evaluation and concluded that a 
student does not qualify as disabled under the IDEA, the school 
district must be afforded a reasonable time to monitor the 
student’s progress before exploring whether further evaluation is 
required. . . . The IDEA does not require a reevaluation every 
time a student posts a poor grade.”).  Plaintiffs’ argument in this 
respect is belied by the record and inconsistent with the findings 
of the state agency below.  D.K. exhibited improvement after his 
April 2006 evaluation, and his continuing misbehavior was 
typical of boys his age.  D.K.’s parents consistently approved 
and cooperated with the behavioral plans devised by his 
teachers.  Moreover, when Dr. Cohen opined in May 2007 that 
D.K. required special education, teachers discussed with her the 
results of the April 2006 evaluation.  The record does not 
disclose that she further pressed for formal accommodations. 
Finally, the measures the School District did take to assist 
D.K. in the classroom militate against finding a Child Find 
violation.  His teachers did not neglect his difficulties.  Far from 
it, they and other Copper Beech faculty took proactive steps to 
afford him extra assistance and worked closely with his parents 
to maximize his potential for improvement.  It would be wrong 
to conclude that the School District failed to identify D.K. as a 
challenged student when it offered him substantial 
accommodations, special instructions, additional time to 
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complete assignments, and one-on-one and specialist attention 
en route to eventually finding a disability.  Cf. M.R., 680 F.3d at 
272 (agreeing with a hearing officer’s decision that no Child 
Find violation occurred where the school district’s investment in 
“addressing [a student’s] needs and providing appropriate 
instruction and interventions before rushing to special education 
identification” was apparent). 
In sum, schools need not rush to judgment or 
immediately evaluate every student exhibiting below-average 
capabilities, especially at a time when young children are 
developing at different speeds and acclimating to the school 
environment.  Moreover, neither the failure to employ a 
functional behavioral assessment nor a subsequent disability 
finding is per se indicative of an inappropriate evaluation.  The 
School District did not breach its Child Find duty by failing to 
test D.K. until April 2006, during his first-grade year, or by 
declining to label him disabled under the IDEA until his second-
grade year. 
Plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory education is further 
foreclosed because the hearing officer, appeals panel, and 
District Court correctly determined that D.K. was not denied a 
FAPE.  D.K. demonstrated academic progress in math and 
reading as he progressed from grade to grade.  During the 2004–
2005 school year, his teachers noted that he possessed advanced 
math skills, and between 2003 and 2006, he received numerous 
“proficient” and “advanced” marks in reading, social studies, 
health and safety, math, music, art, and physical education.  
When D.K. became frustrated with reading and communication 
skills, the School District provided him with one-on-one tutoring 
and gave him additional time to complete tests.  To address his 
below-average social development, D.K.’s teachers designed 
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individualized systems, which yielded some progress.  See L.M., 
478 F.3d at 314 (finding that the school provided a FAPE 
where, although it had not identified the student as IDEA-
eligible, its individualized “interventions . . . were moderately 
successful” and supplied extra assistance necessary for a 
meaningful education); see also M.C., 81 F.3d at 395–96 
(denying compensatory education where the school believed in 
good faith that it was providing an appropriate education, noting 
that “[a] difference of opinion as to the adequacy of an 
educational program is not equivalent to a complete and total 
failure to provide a child with an education”).  Indeed, these are 
precisely the types of special measures D.K.’s neurologist 
recommended after diagnosing him with ADHD.  Therefore, we 
conclude that D.K. received a FAPE and is not entitled to a 
compensatory education award.8
                                                 
8 Our analysis and conclusion in this respect govern not 
only Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims, but also their arguments premised 
on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  Section 504 mandates that 
“‘[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination’ under any program that receives federal funds.”  
M.R., 680 F.3d at 280 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794(a)).  “As we have explained, § 504’s ‘negative 
prohibition’ is similar to the IDEA’s ‘affirmative duty’ and . . . 
requires schools that receive federal financial assistance to 
‘provide a free appropriate public education to each qualified 
handicapped person who is in the recipient’s jurisdiction.’”  Id. 
(quoting W.B., 67 F.3d at 492–93).  As under the IDEA, 
providing a FAPE in accordance with § 504 requires a school 
district to “reasonably accommodate the needs of the 
  See P.P., 585 F.3d at 739. 
 
30 
 
C 
Plaintiffs lastly argue that the District Court erred by 
excluding the expert report of Dr. Emily Perlis and the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education Guidelines, both of 
which Plaintiffs offered for the first time in the District Court.  
A district court reviewing administrative IDEA decisions “shall 
hear additional evidence at the request of a party,” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii), but “the question of what additional 
evidence to admit in an IDEA judicial review proceeding . . . 
should be left to the discretion of the trial court,” Susan N. v. 
Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 1995).  As the 
District Court reasoned, all a court must do is “consider the 
party’s request to admit additional evidence” and “not 
summarily reject” it.  D.K., 2010 WL 1223596, at *4.  The 
district court should not automatically “‘disallow testimony from 
all who did, or could have, testified before the administrative 
hearing,’” Susan N., 70 F.3d at 759–60 (quoting Burlington v. 
Dep’t of Educ. for Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 790–91 (1st Cir. 1984)), 
but the court need not consider evidence that is irrelevant or 
cumulative, see id. at 760. 
First, as the District Court found, the Perlis report is 
largely duplicative of the evidence given at the administrative 
hearings.  Six of the report’s nine pages—a summary of D.K.’s 
early education—were already introduced as exhibits and 
discussed by witnesses before the hearing officer.  Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
handicapped child so as to ensure meaningful participation in 
educational activities and meaningful access to educational 
benefits.”  Id.  Consequently, our finding that the School District 
did not deny D.K. a FAPE is equally dispositive of Plaintiffs’ 
§ 504 claim. 
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her report offers only a commentary, prepared with the benefit 
of hindsight, regarding the evidence and testimony already 
presented to the state agency. 
Second, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions that the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education Guidelines should have 
been admitted because they set forth “necessary components” of 
behavioral support strategies that the School District failed to 
incorporate, the Guidelines offer only non-binding best 
practices.  Holmes v. Milcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 
591 (3d Cir. 2000).  The School District’s failure to adhere to 
those Guidelines does not amount to the denial of a FAPE, so 
they are of only minor relevance at best.  Therefore, we will 
uphold the District Court’s discretionary determination to 
exclude Plaintiffs’ tardy evidence. 
IV 
 In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims are limited to 
the two-year time period between January 8, 2006, and January 
8, 2008.  Having interpreted the IDEA statute of limitations 
exceptions as requiring either intentional or knowing 
misrepresentation of D.K.’s problems and progress or the 
withholding of information expressly required by the IDEA 
statutes and regulations to be disclosed to parents, we hold that 
neither the District Court nor the state agency clearly erred when 
it found Plaintiffs ineligible for the exceptions.  Nor may 
Plaintiffs invoke common law equitable tolling doctrines in the 
face of specifically enumerated exceptions in the governing 
federal statute. 
We further hold that during the relevant portion of D.K.’s 
education at Copper Beech Elementary, the School District 
 
32 
 
consistently monitored, documented, and responded to his 
individual educational needs.  The School District developed 
behavioral improvement systems with his parents’ cooperation 
and offered him special attention and testing accommodations.  
Under these circumstances, we find no Child Find or FAPE 
violation justifying an award of compensatory education.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
